Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases - Thomas v. State by unknown
Maryland Law Review
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 5
Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases -
Thomas v. State
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
This Casenotes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please
contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases - Thomas v. State, 15 Md. L. Rev. 157 (1955)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol15/iss2/5
Casenotes
BURDEN OF PROOF OF INSANITY
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Thomas v. State'
0
Defendant was indicted for first degree murder, rape,
robbery, and burglary by the Grand Jury of Baltimore City.
At the trial, his sole plea was "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity". He was found guilty by a jury and after a motion
for a new trial was denied by the Supreme Bench of Balti-
more, he was sentenced to death.
The trial court, in its advisory charge to the jury, had
directed the jury to apply the "right-wrong" test as estab-
lished in Spencer v. State,2 to determine the question of
defendant's criminal responsibility and also stated that "the
burden is upon the defense to prove insanity by a prepond-
erance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt".3
On appeal, defendant objected to both parts of the charge
contending that: (1) the "right-wrong" test should be over-
ruled as the test for criminal responsibility and that in its
place the broader test as outlined in Durham v. United
States4 be adopted; and (2) the burden of proving insanity
is not properly upon the defense, but upon the state and
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's charge on both points.
The "right-wrong" test5 is still the test of criminal respon-
sibility and the burden of proof of insanity rests upon the
accused.
In order to limit the scope of this note, the only area
that it will attempt to cover is the problem raised by the
1 112 A. 2d 913 (Md., 1955).
269 Md. 28,13 A. 809 (1888).
8 Supra, n. 1, 918.
'214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir., 1954), noted in 15 Md. L. Rev. 44 (1955). See
also Sobeloff, From MeNaghten to Durham and Beyond, 15 Md. L. Rev.
93 (1955).
5 For a discussion of the various tests of criminal responsibility and the
"right-wrong" test and its application in Maryland, see casenote on Durham
v. United States, ibid, in 15 Md. L. Rev. 44 (1955). The Court of Appeals,
in the instant case, despite appellant's argument based on the Durham case,
refused to apply the broader rule although it pointed out in passing that
there was no evidence of mental disease or defect to satisfy the Durham
rule, "which we do not here adopt". See supra, n. 1, 919. Followed in
Bryant v. State, 115 A. 2d 502 (Md., 1955).
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defendant's second contention, i.e., the burden of proof
when insanity is pleaded as a defense to a criminal action.'
BuRDENs AND PREumP1rONS GENERALLY
To understand the divergent views on the question of
the burden of proof in insanity cases, it seems necessary at
the outset to outline the fundamental rationale of burden
of proof and presumptions generally in the law of evidence.
Strictly speaking, the burden of proof on a separate issue
or on the case as a whole can appropriately be called the
risk of non-persuasion of the jury. This would mean, that
the party upon whom the law places the burden of proof
has the ultimate task of persuading the jury. The burden
of proof is placed upon the various parties in the several
classes of cases for a variety of reasons, none of which fall
under a sure or universal test. Primarily, the burden of
proof may be seen to be placed where it fits best, resulting
in "specific rules for specific classes of cases resting for
their ultimate basis upon broad reasons of experience and
fairness"! Along with this risk of non-persuasion, which
never shifts during the course of the trial,9 the party with
the burden of proof also, at the outset, has a duty of going
forward with the evidence. But, this duty, unlike the duty
of persuasion, is a duty toward the judge and not the jury.
If this duty of producing the evidence is not satisfied, the
party with the duty loses by a ruling of the judge and the
evidence never gets to the jury. If, however, this duty of
introducing enough evidence has been satisfied, the pro-
ponent of the evidence is left only with the risk of non-
persuasion of the jury. Then, either party can and does
produce evidence, and if the jury is in doubt after hearing
0 Since the various tests for criminal responsibility have already been
discussed in a previous casenote, ibid, it is felt that by ignoring that aspect
of this case, save an occasional pertinent reference to the aforementioned
note, more space can be afforded this interesting and important question
of burden of proof.
9 WIGMOu, EVIDENCE (3rd ed., 1940), Sec. 2485.
1 Ibid, Sec. 2486, p. 278. Morgan, in his article, Some Observations Con-
cerning Presumptions, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 911 (1931), lists:
".... at least four a priori tests for placing this burden ... upon ...
(1) the party having the affirmative of the issue, (2) the party to
whose case the fact in question is essential, (3) the party having
peculiar means of knowing the facts, and (4) the party who has the
burden of pleading it." (But then says) "the real decision is made
upon the judicial judgment based upon experience as to what is con-
venient, fair, and good policy; and some opinions frankly so declare."
WiGmoR, op. cit., supra, n. 7, Sec. 2489.
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all the evidence, the party with the risk of non-persuasion
must lose.10
A presumption, in its strictest sense, is a rule of law
created by the courts primarily as a device to shorten the
inquiry and hasten judicial proceedings.11 The way pre-
sumptions arise and the purposes they serve are various,
but the effect of a true presumption when strictly applied
is limited. A true presumption in favor of one party oper-
ates to cast the duty of producing the evidence on his
opponent, though the party favored by the presumption
may, himself, have the ultimate burden of proof in the
sense of the risk of non-persuasion of the jury. Thus, the
party against whom the presumption operates becomes the
proponent of the evidence at the outset. If the proponent
does not produce the amount of evidence sufficient to con-
vince the judge that there is a triable question of fact for
the jury, the presumption will defeat the proponent on
the basis of a ruling by the judge. But, when the proponent
has met the burden of producing the evidence, and the
judge so rules, the presumption should disappear since it
has served its full purpose, and the issue should go to the
jury free from any rule, with the original party still bear-
ing the risk of non-persuasion of the jury. Thus, following
this view of presumptions, a presumption should never go
to the jury 2 or be weighed as evidence,"3 and when the
proper evidence has been introduced, the presumption
should disappear and the jury should decide the case on
the basis of all the evidence introduced, with the original
party bearing the burden of proof, no longer being favored
by any presumption. Thus, it can be seen that presump-
tions only bear on the duty of producing the evidence and
not on the ultimate risk of non-persuasion of the jury.4
10 WIGMORE, op. cit., supra, n. 7, Secs. 2487 and 2488. See also, Thomsen,
Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitor Cases in Maryland,
3 Md. L. Rev. 288 (1939).
n THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATIsE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW
(1898), 315.
"Alexander, Presumptions, Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. L. J. 1 (1945).
1It seems well agreed under ithis view that presumptions as a rule of law
can have no probative weight as evidence. THAYER, op. Cit., supra, n. 11,
576, says:
"A presumption itself contributes no evidence and has no probative
quality. It is sometimes said that the presumption will tip the scale
when the evidence is balanced. But, in truth, nothing tips the scale
but evidence and a presumption - being a legal rule or a legal con-
clusion - is not evidence."
See also: McBalne, Presumptions, Are They Evidence?, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519,
545 (1938).
1" This view of presumptions seems to be theoretically sound. Some courts
have confused legal presumptions with inferences of fact, which do have
weight as evidence, and have given presumptions definite evidencial weight.
1955]
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PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
All American jurisdictions agree to the initial proposi-
tion that there exists a presumption that all men are sane
and responsible at the time of a criminal act was com-
mitted." This presumption of sanity is a creature of neces-
sity and obtains principally to save time in the trial of
issues made by the pleadings, since a great deal of time
and effort would be wasted if in every case the state had
to put in full evidence of sanity as it does of all other
material facts. 16 This reasoning was well expressed by the
United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States:
"If that presumption were not indulged the govern-
ment would always be under the necessity of adduc-
ing affirmative evidence of the sanity of an accused.
But a requirement of that character would seriously
delay and embarrass the enforcement of the laws
against crime, and in most cases be unnecessary. '1 7
Thus, at the outset, the accused is presumed sane, until the
issue of insanity is raised by the accused himself as a
defense in his pleadings. Unless this be done, the presump-
tion relieves the state from introducing any evidence of the
sanity of the accused in relation to his responsibility for
the act committed.
Though all the courts agree to this view, they split as to
the weight and effect the presumption will have when the
accused does introduce the plea of insanity into the case.
As will be seen, the jurisdictions placing the burden on the
state more closely follow the normal rule concerning pre-
sumptions and dismiss the presumption of sanity when the
defendant has introduced enough evidence to take the case
to the jury. On the other hand, the jurisdictions placing
the burden of proof on the accused depart from the normal
This results in confusion and anomalies and should be discouraged. The
above view was first advanced by THAYER, op. cit., supra, n. 11, and was
later adopted by WioMoRE, op. cit., 8upra, n. 7, Sec. 2491. It apparently has
the support of Morgan and has been adopted by the AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE'S MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 704. See also: Gausewitz,
Presumptions in a One Rule World, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 324 (1952); MoBaine,
Presumptions; Are They Evidence?, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519 (1938); Morgan,
Techniques in the Use of Presumptions, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 413 (1939);
Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions, 16 So. Cal. L. Rev. 245
(1943) ; Thomsen, Presumptions and Burden of Proof in Res Ipsa Loquitor
Cases in Maryland, supra, n. 10.
1 For a list of cases in all American jurisdictions, see WEIFHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DiENsE (1954), 214.
16 Morgan, Techniques In The Use of Presumptions, supra, n. 14, 416.
17160 U. S. 469, 486 (1895).
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rule and allow the presumption of sanity to persist through-
out the trial as an inference of fact and consequently attach
some weight to it as evidence in favor of the state. 8
BuRDN OF PROOF ON THE PROSECUTION
The view that the prosecution has the burden of proving
the sanity of accused, once it has been raised as an issue,
has the favor of the Federal courts and approximately one-
half of the state courts.19 These jurisdictions take the
sounder theoretical approach, essentially holding that since
a sound mind is necessary to have criminal intent, which is
a definite element of a crime, the prosecution must bear the
burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-persuasion
of the jury as to this element of a crime as it must to all
other material facts.2" True, the prosecution will benefit at
the outset by the presumption in its favor of the defendant's
sanity, but this presumption puts upon the defendant only
the duty of producing the evidence of insanity in the first
instance, so that once the defendant has introduced enough
evidence, the presumption should disappear as a rule of law
and the case goes to the jury with the risk of non-persuasion
of the jury upon the prosecution.2' The Illinois Court ex-
pressed this view when it said in reference to criminal acts
and intent:
"These are... affirmative facts, and must be proved
by the prosecution. The State avers their existence -
they are all essential to constitute the crime, and the
State must prove them - the burden of proof is on the
State. But, it is said, the State is relieved of the burden
by proving the prisoner did the act, the law implying
'
8
WEIHOFEN, Op. cit., supra, n. 15, 216.
"For a complete digest of the burden of proof in insanity cases in all
courts in the United States, see WEIHOFEN, op. cit., supra, n. 15, 241 et seq.
WEIHOFEN feels that the increasing tendency in the American courts is to
put the burden of proof on the state (238), as does GLUECK. (GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW (1925), 41.) WIGMORE, however, feels
that this view is losing favor; op. cit., supra, n. 7, Sec. 2501.
20GLUECK, ibid, 41. See also Davis v. U. S., supra, n. 17; State v. Shuff,
9 Ida. 115, 72 Pac. 664 (1903) ; Hopps v. the People, 31 Ill. 385 (1863) ;
The People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 (1868) ; The People v. McCann, 16 N. Y.
58 (1857).
Z WIGMORE, Op. Cit., supra, n. 7, Sec. 2501; Morgan, Further Observations
on Presumptions, 16 So. Cal. L. Rev. 245, 251 (1943) ; UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE (4th ed., 1935), Sec. 304. As to how much evidence is "enough
evidence" to take the question of sanity to the jury, all states save Nebraska
that put the burden of proof on the state require sufficient evidence to raise
a reasonable doubt of defendant's responsibility. Nebraska's rule is less
strict and holds thalt the presumption prevails only in the absence of evi-
dence of insanity, and if "any evidence" is introduced it becomes a jury
question. See WEIHOFEN, op. cit., supra, n. 15, 227.
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that he intended to do it, and that the presumption is,
every man is of sound mind. These are but presump-
tions, and when they are rebutted by proof of absence
of criminal intention, by reason of unsoundness of
mind, or a reasonable doubt is raised on the point, the
doubt must avail the prisoner .... The prosecution is
bound, on every principle of correct pleading, and of
justice to maintain their allegations, and it is not in
their power to shift the burden on to the defendant....
The burden of proof must, therefore, always remain
with the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.... 22
Thus, under this view, the defendant need only introduce
the initial evidence of insanity, enough to meet the burden
of producing the evidence in order to overcome the pre-
sumption of sanity. Once this duty has been met by the
defendant, the state must prove sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt, as it must prove all other elements of a crime. The
presumption of sanity should disappear and should have
no probative weight as evidence. Furthermore, no mention
of the presumption of sanity should be made to the jury.2"
If the defendant fails to meet this initial burden of produc-
ing enough evidence of insanity, the defendant should lose
on a legal ruling of the judge and the case should never
get to the jury on the question of insanity.
BURDE OF PROOF ON THE AccusED
The other one-half of the American jurisdictions place
the burden of proof upon the defendant who pleads insanity
in a criminal case.24 These jurisdictions place the burden
of proof on the defendant essentially for practical, though
perhaps not theoretically sound, reasons. Wigmore opines
that this view was an outgrowth of the abuses of the oppos-
ing view which puts the burden of proof on the prosecu-
tion.25 The language of the courts in these cases give Wig-
more's conclusion some support.2 6 In Ortwein v. Common-
wealth, the Pennsylvania Court stated:
22 Hopps v. People, supra, n. 20, 394.
28 Unfortunately, some courts that do put the burden of proof upon the
prosecution, though perhaps inadvertently, do give the presumption of
sanity weight as evidence and allow mention of it to the jury. These courts
fail to recognize the true effect of a legal presumption as a legal rule only
which cannot be evidence. See WEIHOuNu, op. cit., supra, n. 15, 216 et seq.
14 See n. 19.
WiomoRo, op. cit., supra, n. 7, Sec. 2485.
2Though some courts support this view with other reasoning, the lan-
guage in most cases points to public policy reasons for placing the burden
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"Merely doubtful evidence of insanity would fill
the land with acquitted criminals. The moment a great
crime would be committed, in the same instant, indeed,
often before, would preparation begin to lay ground to
doubt the sanity of the perpetrator. The more enorm-
ous and horrible the crime, the less credible, by reason
of its enormity, would be the evidence in support of it;
and proportionately weak would the required proof
of insanity to acquit of it .... The danger to society
from acquittals on the ground of a doubtful insanity
demands a strict rule. It requires that the minds of the
triers should be satisfied of the fact of insanity.
' 27
The defendant in these jurisdictions, however, is required
to establish his defense of insanity by the preponderance of
evidence.21 Only Oregon, by statute,29 requires that the de-
fendant establish his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt."0
In the jurisdictions where the defendant has the burden
of proof, it is clear that along with the duty of producing
the evidence, he also has the ultimate risk of non-persuasion
of the jury. The presumption of sanity favoring the prose-
cution here, is more than a legal presumption which is
dispelled by a ruling by the judge, but is instead more an
inference of fact from which the jury can draw conclusions
of fact. The probability that all men are sane is looked
upon as being so strong, that the presumption of sanity
operates to place the entire burden of proof upon the defen-
dant and prevails until the defendant has satisfied the jury
on all the evidence, including the presumption of sanity,
that he is insane. Thus, in these cases, where the defendant
has the total burden of proof (i.e., the duty of producing the
evidence and the risk of non-persuasion of the jury) the pre-
upon the defendant. See leading cases: State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236
S. W. 2d 596 (1951); State v. Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 22 Pac. 241 (1889);
Kelch v. State, 55 Ohio St. 146, 45 N. E. 6 (1896) ; Ortweln v. Common-
wealth, 76 Pa. 414 (1874) ; State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 A. 905 (1904) ;
State v. Klinger, 43 Mo. 127 (1868) ; Boswell v. The Commonwealth, 20 Grat.
(Va.) 860 (1871) ; Holober v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 826, 62 S. E. 2d 816
(1951) ; State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98 (1904).
2176 Pa. 414, 425 (1874).
21 See WEiHoFEN, MENTAL DISORDElt AS A CRIMINAL DrAYiNSE (1954), 212.
2 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940), Sec. 26-929.
10 The United States Supreme Court in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790
(1952), by a split decision, held that this statute does not deprive the defen.
dant of due process of law and Is constitutional.
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sumption of sanity does have weight as evidence"' and is
mentioned to the jury, and perhaps logically so."
MARYLAND RULES
No cases have been found in Maryland, prior to the de-
cision in the Thomas case, dealing with the question of the
burden of proof where the defendant pleads insanity. Thus,
this case, becomes the first Maryland authority in this area
and as such requires close scrutiny in order to determine
Maryland's position and the logical or possible consequences
as a result of the opinion.
To begin with, the factual basis for defendant's plea of
insanity was a poor one, supported by little evidence of
insanity. The defendant was a habitual criminal offender,
having spent part of his youth in the Cheltenham Reforma-
tory. Just prior to the commission of the alleged offenses
he had been released from the Maryland Penitentiary after
apparently serving a full fifteen year term for robbery.
He had left school in the third grade and could neither read
or write.3 The defendant's only evidence of insanity was
the testimony of witnesses to the effect that he had been
drinking just prior to committing the acts charged and that
he was hostile while under the influence of alcohol, plus
testimony of the Chief Medical Officer of the Supreme
Bench of Baltimore, a psychiatrist, part of which follows:
... poor intellectual endowments, but not clearly
mentally defective. Cannot read or write. Certainly
could conclude from these examinations that the pa-
'WEIHOFEN, op. cit., supra, n. 28, 216. Though the courts that do put
the burden of proof on the defendant do consistently give the presumption
of sanity weight as evidence, their position can be justified if the presump-
tion is looked upon not as a presumption at all, but instead as a factual
inference from which the jury can draw conclusions of fact. But, even here,
McBaine argues that this position is unfair to the defendant. In Presump-
tions, Are They Evidence?, 26 Cal. L. Rev. 519, 544 (1938), he states:
"A jury empaneled to determine insanity may weigh the testimony
of witnesses and other evidence and if the testimony of the witnesses
and the other evidence does not convince them of the defendant's
'defense' of insanity, they may reject the defense. They can rationally
do this and only this. They cannot rationally weigh a rule of law
against the testimony of witnesses. To itell a jury to weigh a rule of
law is to command them to do the impossible - to employ sophistry
of the rankest kind. Further, such an instruction is highly unfair to a
defendant because the jury may give the legal presumption any weight
they so desire. They may conclude that it outweighs the testimony of
forty - any number - of witnesses of the highest character and the
utmost knowledge possessed upon the subject by any living person."
'*See Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59 (1933).
Supra, n. 1, 914.
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tient is not so defective that he would not realize that
it was wrong and illegal to rob, rape, and murder....
I felt that the patient had sufficient intellectual capacity
to know that it was morally and legally wrong to rape,
murder, rob, or any of the acts of which he is ac-
cused, ... "I'
Clearly, the psychiatric testimony did more to support the
proposition of sanity than insanity.
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the burden of proof
aspect of the case, first quoted some textbook authority"8
to the effect that the burden of proof is upon the accused in
the majority of jurisdictions. Without more, the Court then
said:
"Even in the Durham case, supra, upon which the
appellant so strongly relies, the following is quoted
from Tatum v. United States, 1951, 88 U. S. App. D. C.
386, 190 F. 2d 612: 'When lack of mental capacity is
raised as a defense to a charge of crime, the law accepts
the general experience of mankind and presumes that
all people, including those accused of crime are sane.'
So long as this presumption prevails, the prosecution
is not required to prove the defendant's sanity. But
'as soon as "some evidence of mental disorder is intro-
duced,. . . sanity, like any other fact, must be proved
as part of the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable
doubt".' "86
And concluded:
it **there is no evidence here of any mental dis-
order to shift the burden of proof to the state, as in the
Durham and Stewart cases, supra, even if we decided
to follow the rule laid down in these cases as to the
burden of proof, which we do not decide. The charge
of the trial judge was correct."8
Thus, the Court, after briefly quoting some law appli-
cable to one side of the case, affirmed the trial court's charge
Supra, n. 1, 915.
Supra, n. 1, 918. The court quoted sections of the following texts, all
to the effect that the prevailing view is to place the burden of proof upon
the defendant: WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW, Vol. 1 (12th ed.), Sec. 78;
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed.), Sec. 304; 40 C. J. S., HOMICIDM
Sec. 194, subd. a, Insanity.
Supra, n. 1, 919. Both the Durham case, see 8upra, n. 4, and the Tatum
case (citation in above quote) mentioned by the court take the position
that the burden of proof is on the state to prove sanity when some evidence
of mental disorder is introduced by the defendant, and maintain that this
is the prevailing view.
Supra, n. 1, 919.
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placing the burden of proof upon the defendant, and dis-
counted a decision on the opposite view, because of the little
evidence produced by the defendant at the trial. In other
words, the Court refused to give consideration to the view
that places the burden of proof on the state because the
defendant did not introduce the "some evidence of mental
disorder" necessary, under that view, to make sanity a part
of the state's case.
It must be said that the Court was probably right in
deciding that there was not enough evidence of insanity
produced by the defendant even in a jurisdiction that puts
the burden of proof on the state, (i.e., not enough evidence
under that theory to satisfy the defendant's duty of produc-
ing the evidence at the outset, so as to dispel the presump-
tion of sanity and to put the state upon its ultimate task of
persuading the jury) since even the Chief Medical Officer's
testimony did little to support a plea of insanity. Though
that aspect of the opinion may have been correct, it never-
theless seems unfortunate that the Court, when adopting
the view placing the burden of proof on the defendant, re-
fused to take a more decisive stand on Maryland's position
on the view placing the burden on the state, regardless of
whether there was enough evidence to support that view.
Clearly, the question is one that can be decided in but one
of two possible ways, since the burden of proof can ulti-
mately be placed upon one party, either the defendant or
the state, resulting in a situation where the adoption of one
view necessarily requires the rejection of the competing
view. Thus, any clear decision on the issue would have
considered both views, but would have adopted one view
for good reasons and would have rejected the other com-
pletely. To attempt to so otherwise would be to avoid the
question - to decide nothing.
The Court of Appeals, in the instant case, apparently
attempted to avoid taking such a decisive stand, thus leav-
ing the question in a somewhat ambiguous state in Mary-
land. While it was obviously in favor of placing the burden
on the defendant, it was reluctant to openly reject the posi-
tion placing the burden upon the state. 8 To avoid the
obvious problem, the Court simply affirmed the trial court's
charge which placed the burden of proof upon the defen-
dant, and dismissed any real decision on the opposite view
because there was too little evidence introduced in the case
8 The language in the opinion leads one to this conclusion. If the court
meant to reject completely the view placing the burden upon the state,
could it not have said in reference to this rule, "which we do not adopt"
rather ,than ". . . which we do not decide?" See, supra, n. 1, 919.
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to support it, thus, leaving the Court's attitude toward the
latter view open to conjecture. So uncertain is the Court's
language in this part of the opinion, that one cannot help
wonder whether, if the defendant had introduced enough
evidence to meet the requirements of the view placing the
burden on the state, the Court might not have adopted that
view, despite the fact that the decision does affirm the trial
court's charge embodying the opposite view. It would seem
that the nature of the problem and the significance of both
views in American law today, 9 should have warranted a
much more clearcut and expository decision, regardless of
which position the Court chose to take, than is found in
the instant case.
But, even if one dismisses the above uncertainties in the
opinion and accepts the case solely as one supporting the
view placing the burden of proof upon the accused, the
decision still leaves much to be desired. The discussion of
the position adopted was scanty, the Court quoting only
textbook authority to support its viewpoint, without even
considering the public policy reasons usually motivating
the adoption of this rule.40 No mention was made of the
presumption of sanity, though it must be assumed to obtain
in Maryland following the general usage in the other juris-
dictions that have decided this question.41 Assuming the
presumption does exist, should it be mentioned to the jury
or have weight as evidence?42 Nothing was said in relation
to any of these matters. In short, the Court merely adopted
a rule of law, no more, leaving all problems and reasoning
attendant to it to conjecture.
It seems regrettable that this important question should
have been put to the Court of Appeals on such a poor factual
situation. Perhaps, if the case had been closer and the de-
fendant's evidence of insanity greater, the Court would
have been required to take a more definite stand on this
important, though controversial question. It is believed,
however, that the instant case does not bar a more decisive
opinion on the question in the future.
CONCLUSION
The Thomas decision probably puts the rule placing the
burden of proof on the defendant in the slight majority in
Supra, n. 19.
*
0 Supra, n. 26.
S 8upra, n. 15.See supra, ns. 13, 14, 31.
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American jurisdictions today.43 The other rule, however,
placing the burden upon the state, both from a theoretical
and public policy standpoint, seems to be the better one.44
Clearly, from a theoretical standpoint alone, the latter view
is correct. It is elementary that in each criminal case the
state must prove the accused's guilt of crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.45 The state bears this burden both in the
sense of the duty of producing the evidence and risk of non-
persuasion of the jury. It is generally agreed, that to have
a punishable crime the state must prove the concurrence
of two factors: (1) the criminal act itself; (2) intent, or
mens rea, on the part of the actor to commit crime.46 A plea
of "not guilty by reason of insanity" essentially is a plea
whereby the accused admits committing the act alleged,
but because of his insanity denies he had the necessary in-
tent to commit a criminal act. It is only logical then, that
the state bear the burden of proving this element of a
crime, as it does the other elements, i.e., the corpus delicti
and the criminal act. By putting the burden of proof upon
the state to prove the accused's sanity, the law thus re-
quires the state to prove that the accused had the necessary
mental faculties to formulate a criminal intent, without
which no crime could result from the act committed. Even
the presumption of sanity is more favorably handled under
this rule. Here, it can take its place as a normal presump-
tion bearing only on the defendant's duty of producing the
initial evidence of insanity, being dispelled when this duty
is fulfilled, instead of persisting throughout the trial as
evidence in favor of the state, as it does in jurisdictions
placing the burden of proof upon the accused.4"
The jurisdictions that place the burden of proof on the
accused, while probably recognizing the above rule as ad-
hering closer to sound legal principles, take their position
essentially from fear that such a rule would encourage
abuse of the defense of insanity and would lead to malinger-
ing in cases where this defense would be strictly unjus-
'4Before the decision in the instant case, the jurisdictions were about
evenly split on this question, with the different authorities claiming either
side to be the prevailing view. See supra, n. 19.
44 See UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed., 1935), 597; 2 JONES ON
EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1926), Sec. 535; GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1925), 41; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW (1898), 382. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTiTUTE acting
on Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955) of THE MODEL PENAL CODE voted to strike
from Sec. 4.03(1) the bracketed language which would have placed the
burden on the defendant.
UNDERHILL'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (4th ed., 1935), Sec. 51.
"CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (5th ed., 1952), Sec. 38.
4 See supra, ns. 13, 14, 23.
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tified.48 It is felt that this fear can be largely minimized,
however, since psychiatrists, appearing as witnesses, in
most cases can easily detect malingering, as can the average
judge or jury, who do not seem to be prone to accept a plea
of insanity too readily, especially in the more serious crimes
such as homicide.4 9 But, even supposing these fears be jus-
tified, they would not seem to warrant a rule departing
from accepted principles of criminal law, since the danger
of abuse is inherent in our system of criminal justice, which
while attempting to detect and punish crime, keeps as of
paramount importance the protection of the innocent man.5"
As Mr. Justice Harlan put it in Davis v. United States:
"It seems to us that undue stress is placed.., upon
the fact that, in prosecutions for murder, the defense
of insanity is frequently resorted to and is sustained
by the evidence of ingenious experts whose theories
are difficult to be met and overcome. Thus, it is said,
crimes of the most atrocious character often go un-
punished, and the public safety is thereby endangered.
But the possibility of such results must always attend
any system devised to ascertain and punish crime, and
ought not to induce the courts to depart from principles
fundamental in criminal law, and the recognition and
enforcement of which are demanded by every con-
sideration of humanity and justice."'"
See supra, ns. 25, 26, 27.
" See WFMHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954), 220,
footnotes 3 and 4.
10 See JoNEs oN EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1926), 622, fn. 7, where it is said:
"It would be a reproach to justice if a guilty man escaped the penalty
for a crime upon a feigned mental irresponsibility, or postponed his
trial upon a feigned condition of the mind, such as to his alleged in-
ability to aid in his defense. It would be likewise a reproach to justice
and to our institutions if a human being, 'made in God's own image',
while suffering, as the old books put it, 'under a visitation of God',
were compelled to go to trial at a time when he is not sufficienitly in
possession of his mental facilities to enable him to make a rational
and proper defense. The latter would be a more grievous error than
the former; since in the one case an individual would go unwhipped
of justice, while in the other the great safeguards which 'the law adopts
in the punishment of crime and the upholding of justice would be
rudely invaded by the tribunal whose sacred duty it is to uphold the
law in all its integrity."
160 U. S. 469, 492 (1895).
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